Conspiracy of Silence by Markus, Richard M.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1965
Conspiracy of Silence
Richard M. Markus
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard M. Markus, Conspiracy of Silence, 14 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 520 (1965)
Conspiracy of Silence
Richard M. Markus *
Medicine is of all the arts the most noble; but, owing to
the ignorance of those who practice it, and of those who,
inconsiderately, form a judgment of them, it is at present
far behind all the other arts. Their mistake appears to
me to arise principally from this, that in the cities there
is no punishment connected with the malpractice of
medicine (and with it alone) except disgrace, and that
does not hurt those who are familiar with it.
T HESE RATHER STRONG WORDS of criticism are those of the
most distinguished physician of history-Hippocrates.' The
revered Hippocratic Oath calls upon every physician to pro-
claim: 2
Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into them for the
benefit of the sick, and will abstain from every voluntary
act of mischief and corruption.
Hippocrates' concern for discipline of the medical profession by
itself and by society found its cognate in the Code of Hammurabi
of 1750 B. C., which provided that if a physician caused a man's
death or the loss of his eye by an operation, the physician's
fingers were to be cut off. If he caused the death of a slave, he
was obliged to restore a slave of equal value.3
The later Justinian Code of the Romans made a similar pro-
vision, that if a surgeon operates on one's slave, and then neg-
lects altogether to attend to his cure, or operates unskillfully, so
that the slave dies in consequence, he is liable for the highest
value of that slave within the preceding year.4 In this country
our own legal history includes the very early malpractice case
of Cross v. Guthrie5 in 1794 when a jury awarded $120.00 for
the wrongful death of the plaintiff's wife as a result of the de-
* Of Sindell, Sindell, Bourne, Markus, Stern & Spero (Cleveland, Ohio);
Asst. Prof., Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 See, Adams, Genuine Works of Hippocrates, "The Law," p. 281 (1929).
2 See, Id., "The Oath," p. 280.
3 See, Allen, Evolution of Governments and Laws, "Code of Hammurabi,"
Sec. 210, p. 1001 (1916); Oleck, Damages to Persons & Property, 4 (1961 rev.
ed.).
4 See, Moyle, Institutes of Justinian, Title III, "Of the Lex Aquila," pp.
169-70 (2nd ed. 1889).
5 Mass. (unreported).
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fendant-physician's malpractice. That history also includes the
case of Ritchey v. West, in which Abraham Lincoln unsuccess-
fully defended a physician against a malpractice claim in 1860,
a few months before entering the White House.
If the medical societies were in fact openly exposing the
errors of their fellows, one might expect that the repeatedly
careless physician would be ousted from all privileges and that
the attorney seeking to advance a meritorious civil damage ac-
tion would receive every aid and assistance from other phy-
sicians. Regrettably, neither appears to be the case. In a survey
conducted by the American Medical Association, with ques-
tionnaires to 1100 county medical societies, the AMA committee
found that a total of only 21 doctors had been expelled from those
societies, in the two-year interval over which the survey ran.'
Of those 21 persons, only 4 doctors in the entire United States
had been expelled during those two years for offenses against
patients. When we compare this to the magnitude and frequency
of disciplinary action against attorneys, we are induced to con-
clude that the medical societies are unwilling or unable to dis-
cipline their own ranks. For example, in Ohio alone, eighteen
attorneys were disciplined last year; and others were induced
to submit voluntary resignations from practice.8
The problem for the lawyer is exemplified by a case that
arose in Cleveland which involved a young lady who sustained
certain psychiatric injuries as the result of plastic surgery. The
physician had blatantly advertised under "Plastics" in the Yel-
low Pages of the telephone directory with "before and after"
nose pictures. There have been some 20 lawsuits fied against
him for medical malpractice. He had no malpractice insurance
and no carrier would issue any to him. The local medical so-
ciety knew all these facts and held him in very low esteem.
However, when counsel requested help from that society in lo-
cating a witness to testify against this man, the society refused
6 23 IlM. 329 (1860).
7 See, Carter, The Doctor Business, p. 122 (1958). In 1961 only one phy-
sician in the United States was expelled from a medical society, and that
did not prevent him from continuing to practice. A new law is being con-
sidered in California to authorize the State Board of Medical Examiners
to take licenses from physicians who are hazards to public health. See
Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1965, pp. 1-2.
8 Office of the Administrative Assistant of the Supreme Court of Ohio, "Ohio
Courts," p. 1 (1964).
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to make any efforts in this direction and said that it was up to
each individual plastic surgeon whether he wished to testify.
When no expert witness could be found, the case was tried
solely on an assault and battery charge because the patient was
only 18 years of age when she consented to the procedure.
Eventually even this charge was lost when the Ohio Su-
preme Court held that a reasonably mature minor can effectively
consent to such a surgical procedure. 9 The aftermath of this
story was not pleasant. The client manifested greater psychiatric
complications. She eventually tried to shoot the doctor and was
institutionalized. Several years after the case was concluded,
the doctor was indicted for double manslaughter as a result
of the deaths of two women in his office (over a two-week
period), when he attempted surgery while under the influence
of narcotics. He, too, was institutionalized.
The requirement that independent expert medical testimony
establish the proper standard of care and the defendant's failure
to meet that standard imposes an almost insurmountable ob-
stacle in many cases. The so-called conspiracy of silence has
been recognized, as a matter of judicial notice, by courts in New
Jersey,10 California," and elsewhere. The use of that phrase
to describe the unavailability of medical witnesses has particu-
larly dramatic force which impresses a court and jury. How-
ever, no apt phrase could detract from the reality of this practical
problem which faces an attorney representing a client seeking
damages from a physician for professional negligence. This does
not mean that medical testimony is always totally unavailable.
If such were the case, the relatively small number of malprac-
tice cases that are successful would be even smaller. There are a
few physicians who will extend themselves to speak their true
opinions forthrightly in the interest of justice. There are a few
9 Lacey v. Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N. E. 2d 25, 1 Ohio Ops. 2d 158
(1956).
10 Steiginga v. Thron, 30 N. J. Super. 423, 105 A. 2d 10 (App. Div. 1954).
See other cases cited at Louisell & Williams, Trial of Medical Malpractice
Cases, Sections 14.01 and 14.02 (1960).
11 Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App.
2d 560, 317 P. 2d 170 (1957). As one defense counsel acknowledged, "The
most obvious attack for the plaintiff is to get himself his own expert who
will testify against the defendant. Despite propaganda to the contrary, this
is no easy task, and the plaintiff may find it impossible unless the case
borders on criminal negligence." See, Murphy, Medical Malpractice, 7 De-
fense L. J. 6-8 (1960).
Sept., 1965
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circumstances in which other physicians will testify adversely to
a doctor located outside of their professional or geographical
community. There are still other physicians who will consult
informally with plaintiff's counsel to assist in determining the
technical details of a potential claim. But no attorney who has
represented plaintiffs in this field of practice will deny that there
is a special problem of obtaining supporting medical testimony.
This difficulty demeans both the legal and medical pro-
fessions. To the extent that any non-legal force defeats or en-
hances a litigant's position, the legal profession loses its strength
and value. To the extent that a physician is protected from the
consequences of his own mistakes, the medical profession is dis-
couraged from maintaining its established level of proficiency
and competence. To the extent that essential medical witnesses
are difficult to locate, the orderly processes of negotiation are
hampered by an understandable reluctance of plaintiff's coun-
sel to reveal his potential expert-for fear that the witness will
be dissuaded from further cooperation. And, to the extent that
both professions fail to provide a just resolution of the public's
rights in these areas, public confidence in each profession suffers
from a frustration related to the inability to obtain a remedy in
the presence of a known right.
The seeds of a solution to this disturbing problem might be
seen from an analysis of its sources. The simplest explanation,
though not necessarily the most accurate, is professional pride
and cameraderie of the medical profession. While a potential
medical witness is naturally reluctant to speak out against a
brother physician, it is doubtful that such fraternal allegiance
would be sufficient to create this problem. The same interest in
protecting the group likewise affects witnesses engaged in vir-
tually every occupation and profession, to a greater or lesser
extent. Scientists, lawyers, engineers, architects and other pro-
fessionals are periodically called upon to testify against another
member of the same profession. Despite their concern that such
testimony might engender hostility or even recrimination, such
other professionals do appear with some frequency in judicial
proceedings. While a physician is not often heard to attack the
work of another physician in public, most hospitals have com-
mittee meetings during which the mistakes of members of the
staff are dissected and debated. If these mistakes are sufficiently
gross or sufficiently frequent, the offending physician is in-
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss3/9
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formally persuaded to mend his ways, to leave the hospital staff,
or even to leave the medical community.
A far greater force in restraining physicians from testifying
would seem to be a widespread hysteria among members of that
profession. Fear that medical malpractice claims are increasing
in size and frequency at an incredible rate deters every member
of that profession from cooperating in such claims. Too many
physicians suffer from a veritable terror that ruin and destruc-
tion lie ahead for them in the course. It is commonplace for pro-
fessional medical journals to carry extended articles relating to
malpractice claims, their magnitude and their oppressiveness. A
recent copy of Medical Economics,1 2 a widely circulated pro-
fessional periodical, contains three separate articles on this sub-
ject in a single issue. Seldom is the suggestion made that a
careful physician who executes his duties with dignity, knowl-
edge, and compassion is relatively safe from any substantial
damage recovery.
As a matter of fact, the American Medical Association con-
ducted two surveys of its membership to determine the true level
of medical malpractice claims. The first survey was in 1956.13
Results of the more recent survey were published late last year
in the Journal of the American Medical Association. 14 That
article shows that only 17.8% of the physicians in active private
practice in the United States have ever had any malpractice
claim asserted against them. The 1956 survey showed almost the
identical percentage of such physicians against whom claims had
been made. Indeed, the percentage of physicians against whom
claims had ever been made was slightly less in 1963 than in 1956.15
On the basis of presumed numbers of physician-patient
visits, the AMA estimated that the proportionate risk rate of
malpractice claims to patient visits is approximately 37/100,000
of 1%. The Law Department of the AMA concludes in the re-
cent article: 16
12 Vol. 42, No. 4 (Feb. 22, 1965).
13 For an analysis of the results of that survey and its meaning to medical
negligence insurance, see McAtee, Malpractice Insurance, 64 Best's Ins.
News, No. 4, pp. 61 et seq. (August 1963).
14 189 J. A. M. A., No. 11, pp. 859 et seq. (Sept. 14, 1964).
15 See Id. at 861.
16 Id. at 860. Since the A. M. A. data shows that there is "less than one
claim for every 270,000 physician-patient visits, an interesting comparison
(Continued on next page)
Sept., 1965
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It is important, however, that the legal risks for physicians
not be exaggerated. Every profession has its risks, and the
risk of liability claims is one which must be borne by the
medical profession. In the practice of medicine some avoid-
able mistakes are bound to occur. When injury to a patient
results, it should be compensated in a just and reasonable
manner.
Practitioners in this area might be interested to know that the
percent of physicians reporting any claim history in Ohio is
significantly below the national average.
17
The disposition of malpractice claims is also interesting. The
1956 survey showed that only 32.4% of all claims were settled
by the payment of any amount whatever, which contrasts vividly
with the experience of most attorneys, that general personal in-
jury claims are settled in approximately 95% of the cases.',
Among the cases that were actually litigated, the 1956 survey
showed that only 18.7% resulted in verdicts for the plaintiff,
which again contrasts strikingly with the experience of personal
injury lawyers that, in general, the plaintiff wins at least half
of all litigated cases.'0 A simple index of the magnitude and
frequency of successful malpractice claims might be the premium
for malpractice insurance. Although some physicians cry out
that these rates are oppressive, they almost never come close to
the appropriately adjusted rate for automobile liability in-
surance. We must remember that a physician treats patients for
at least 5 times as many hours every day as he drives his car, yet
his medical malpractice premium is nowhere near 5 times his
automobile liability insurance premium. 20 The experience of
some lawyers active in this field of practice indicates that there
(Continued from preceding page)
can be made to the doctor's vulnerability to automobile claims. Reliable
statistics indicate that there is approximately one automobile collision for
every 60,000 miles driven. Thus, a physician has less chance of incurring a
malpractice claim by treating that next patient than he has of an automo-
bile collision by driving his car the next 500 yards. See O'Connell, Taming
The Automobile, 58 NW. L. Rev. 299, 323 (1963).
17 See 189 J. A. M. A., No. 11, p. 860 (Sept. 14, 1964).
18 See, Id. at 861.
19 See, Id. at 860; McAtee, Malpractice Insurance, op. cit. supra, note 13, at
n. 11. Verdicts and settlements seldom exceed $5,000.00. See, Medical Eco-
nomics, Vol. 32, No. 8, pp. 178, 185 (May 1955).
20 See McAtee, op. cit. supra, n. 13, pp. 61-62; Lewis, What's Your Best Buy
in Malpractice Insurance?, 32 Medical Economics (8), pp. 156 et seq. (May
1955).
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are 2 to 3 cases against physicians for negligence in driving auto-
mobiles for every medical malpractice case.
Another source that encourages the reluctant medical wit-
ness to remain silent is that branch of the legal profession which
actively defends medical malpractice cases. It is not at all un-
usual for defendant's counsel to contact each of the other treat-
ing physicians and to recommend that they avoid all discussions
with plaintiff's counsel. Since he often represents the same mal-
practice insurer that protects the other witnesses, his advice is
usually given considerable weight by those other physicians. The
Chairman of the Malpractice Committee of the International
Association of Insurance Counsel made this statement in that
organization's Journal: 21
In lecturing to the M.D.'s, I have always emphasized the
need for mutual cooperation on the theory if the M.D.'s do
not hang together they will most assuredly hang separately.
By using this tactic, defense counsel have been eminently suc-
cessful in closing doors which one should ordinarily expect to
find open and in closing minds which we would hope to find im-
partial.
Just this year the Federal Court in Cleveland refused to dis-
miss a lawsuit against the malpractice insurance company itself
which alleged similar conduct. 22 In that case the plaintiff was a
patient in a hospital and had sustained additional injury when
the leg of his hospital bed broke, throwing him to the floor. In
an action against the hospital's malpractice insurer, he alleged
that defense counsel contacted the plaintiff's private physician
on the pretense that he was investigating a potential claim
against the doctor, that he induced the doctor to divulge privi-
leged communications, and that he intimidated the doctor to dis-
continue treatment of the patient who had committed the un-
pardonable sin of making a malpractice claim against the hos-
pital. The court first ruled that the alleged facts did assert a
proper cause of action for damages against the insurer by
having induced a breach of contract between the plaintiff and
his physician. As the court noted, that physician was in a par-
ticularly able position to treat the patient by reason of his pre-
vious knowledge of the injury and medical background.
21 See, Morris, Malpractice: Medical-The Important Events of the Last Two
Years, 30 Ins. Counsel J. 44, 67 (Jan. 1963).
22 Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 237 F. Supp. 96 (N. D. Ohio, E. D.
1965).
Sept., 1965
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The language of the court in upholding the claim for in-
ducing a breach of confidential relationship, the second element
of the claim, is interesting and worth stating:
The policy of the law is to promote a full and free disclosure
of all information by the patient to his treating physician;
this information entrusted to the doctor creates a fiduciary
responsibility in regard to that information. Those con-
fidences in the trust of a physician are entitled to the same
consideration as a res in the control of a trustee, and the
activities of a doctor in regard to those confidences must be
subjected to the same close scrutiny as the activities of a
trustee in supervising a res. Consequently this aspect of the
instant case must be appraised in the line of principles gov-
erning third party complicity with a trustee's misfeasance.
Whether this decision or potential parallel decisions will inhibit
the blatant attempts by defense counsel to stifle communica-
tions between the plaintiff's lawyers and the plaintiff's physicians
is yet to be seen.
The last principal source of medical muteness is the law
itself. The development of special legal rules in medical neg-
ligence cases has made the unavailability of medical testimony
more significant, and consequently more prevalent. The absolute
necessity that plaintiff produce a physician to testify as to the
standard of care is to a large degree unparalleled in other liti-
gation. The trier of fact is ordinarily able to determine reason-
able care in designing complicated machinery or operating in-
strumentalities which he has never seen, with or without expert
testimony, as to such a standard.23 Yet, he is precluded by the
law from determining whether a physician exercised due care
on the basis of detailed testimony as to the acts which were
done and extended explanations of available alternative pro-
cedures. Most jurors probably form their own opinions as to
the reasonable standard of medical care in the circumstances, and
disregard or weigh lightly an expert's statement as to the ex-
tent of care exercised by this medical community. Jurors are
understandably more interested in the reasons for opinions as
to a standard of care than they are in the professionally as-
23 While experts frequently do testify as to the standard of care in other
fields of negligence law, there is not the same blind insistence that the
standard can only be proved by expert testimony. Indeed, some courts
prohibit such testimony in non-medical negligence cases on the theory that
it is testimony on the ultimate issue and invades the province of the jury.
See cases cited at 32 C. J. S., Evidence, Sec. 448; 7 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec.
1951 (1940).
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss3/9
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serted opinions as to those standards. Yet the courts generally
demand the expression of an expert opinion.24 In so doing, the
judicial system unduly emphasizes the importance of that
opinion testimony. This emphasis induces physicians to weigh
with great deliberation their decision whether to express an
expert opinion adverse to another physician in the face of the
extra-legal forces discussed above.
Some courts further complicate this already difficult situa-
tion by insisting that the expert opinion must be given by a
member of the same geographical community. In today's medi-
cine, physicians are guided by national medical knowledge, na-
tional specialty certifications, national board examinations, na-
tional drug literature, national medical societies, national medi-
cal publications, national hospital standards, and national medi-
cal conventions. It is not at all unusual for a physician to ob-
tain his training in one community and to practice in another.
Consequently, most courts are quite willing to allow testimony
of a physician from a different geographical community, par-
ticularly when its medical facilities are not grossly different.
25
The law also aggravates this problem in some jurisdictions
by prohibiting cross-examination of the defendant-physician as
to the standard of care in his community. 20 In virtually every
24 E.g., Ayers v. Parry, 192 F. 2d 181 (3rd Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U. S.
980, Merker v. Wood, 307 Ky. 331, 210 S. W. 2d 946 (1948), Toy v. Rickert,
53 N. J. Super. 27, 146 A. 2d 510 (App. Div. 1958); Haggerty v. McCarthy,
344 Mass. 136, 181 N. E. 2d 562, 94 A. L. R. 2d 998 (1962). See also, Louisell &
Williams, cited infra at n. 25, Sec. 11.10. Some states permit the use of
learned treatises to supply at least some evidence of the standard of care,
by statute or case decision. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., Ch. 233, Sec. 79C (1959);
Nev. Rev. Stat., Sec. 51.040 (1961); Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558
(1857); Stone v. Proctor, 131 S. E. 2d 297, 259 N. C. 633; 99 A. L. R. 2d 593
(1963).
25 See Annotation, 8 A. L. R. 2d 772; Louisell & Williams, op. cit. supra,
note 10, Sec. 8.06; Riley v. Layton, 329 F. 2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964). Cf. Wis.
Stat., Sec. 147.14(2) (a) (1961). These difficulties are further enlarged for
the lawyer who is precluded from compelling production of hospital records
before suit is filed. Compare Wallace v. University Hospitals, 84 Ohio L.
Abs. 224 (Ct. App. 1960), appeal dismissed as moot, 171 Ohio St. 487 (1960),
with Phillips v. Mercy Hospital Ass'n. (Stark Co. App.), appeal dismissed
as moot, 2 Ohio St. 2d 86 (1965). Where the hospital declines to make the
records available before suit, and a court will not compel their production,
the patient's lawyer is prevented from examining the records in determining
whether a negligence claim has merit. He must then file a suit which may
later prove groundless and from which he may find it difficult to with-
draw. Both professions suffer from this situation.
26 See Louisell & Williams, op. cit. supra, note 10, at n. 25, Sec. 11.10; Mc-
Cord, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 549, 619(1959).
Sept., 1965
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other negligence action, an expert defendant can be asked what
procedures and techniques are used by the industry or profession
generally. 27 When the defendant-physician cannot be asked the
same question, the courts are needlessly demanding that some
other physician describe that standard. In many cases the
standard of care is not truly an issue, and the conflict rests on
a factual dispute as to what was done. But even in these cases,
plaintiff's counsel must seek out another physician to set that
indisputable standard before the court, unless he has the power
to compel the defendant to admit a proposition which he would
be totally unwilling to deny. Thus, again, the law in some juris-
dictions has become an instrumentality to enhance beyond pro-
portion the need for expert medical testimony, and has thereby
strengthened the resolution of those who would discourage such
testimony.
The solutions to this problem are not open or obvious. Some
efforts can be made to eradicate the sources with the hope that
the problem will diminish as the pressures for its existence dis-
appear. From a short term viewpoint, the lawyer representing a
claimant in a medical negligence case must accept the burden
of looking for an expert witness. Sometimes the claimant's other
treating physicians can and do serve in this capacity. Some-
times physicians from another city may serve this purpose. Oc-
casionally, a physician is willing to testify in a case against an
osteopath, and pharmacologists or toxicologists may be willing
to testify in cases against physicians. Academic leaders in medi-
cal schools or hospital administration are not quite so severely
subject to social pressures of the medical society, and may be
more willing to speak their minds openly. Study in the medical
library can reveal the names of potential witnesses when coun-
sel reviews their articles in the journals. The attorney's own
doctor friend could be the necessary witness.
In jurisdictions which use a panel of so-called "impartial
medical witnesses," this may be one potential source of testi-
mony. Such a panel has been establishing in Cleveland, but it
can be called upon only when both sides agree. 28 However, the
27 The custom and practice of the industry is a subject for fact testimony
and does not ordinarily require expertise beyond familiarity with the prac-
tices of members of that industry or trade.
28 See Rules of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Ohio,
Rule 21-B ("Pre-Trial Medical Plan") (effective Nov. 9, 1959). The rule
(Continued on next page)
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defendant is generally opposed to any reference of a malpractice
matter to that impartial medical panel, believing that he can
otherwise effectively prevent the claimant from obtaining a com-
petent witness to support his position. Sometimes a request to
the medical academy will receive some attention, but medical
societies often decline to involve themselves. Here is what the
committee head of one county medical society committee wrote
when he was supplied the relevant facts of a potential claim
with appropriate photographs and asked for their assistance in
mediating such a case:
It is the policy of our group to function as intermediary
between patient and doctor when so desired by both. We
do not consider claims by third parties and most particularly
not when legal counsel is involved. By the time the latter
has entered the scene, matters have progressed beyond the
point where we can be of service.
If a case involving a similar claim of malpractice has been
adjudicated in the same jurisdiction, a search of the court rec-
ords can reveal the name of the physician who testified for that
plaintiff. Having spoken out once, he may be willing to do so
again. When all else fails, some counsel have attempted the use
of blind or mass subpoenas. Numerous specialists in the field
invoked are subpoenaed to come to court even though they re-
fused to speak to the plaintiff's counsel about the subject. Mani-
festly, this is a dangerous route and may well produce more
adverse testimony than favorable testimony, but, at this juncture,
the attorney is "grasping for straws" to preserve a case that he
firmly believes to be meritorious.
From a long range viewpoint, additional efforts can be made
(Continued from preceding page)
does not expressly require approval of all parties to the use of the medical
panel, but this is the practical effect of the following requirement in the
rule:
Before a Pre-Trial Judge shall order an examination and report by a
panel of medical experts as provided herein, the parties, by their re-
spective counsel shall stipulate in writing (1) that in the event the
cause is tried, neither side shall make any reference to the fact that
a medical plan had been utilized at or during pre-trial or to the fact
that any medical witness appearing at the trial had previously served
as such panel member; and (2) that in the event of a breach of such
commitment the trial Judge shall be authorized to immediately declare
a mistrial.
In addition, it can never be assumed that a particular physician (or panel
of physicians) is necessarily impartial, since his own attitudes, background
and experience must affect his judgment. See Manning, Disability and the
Law, p. 37 (Congress of Neurological Surgeons 1962).
Sept., 1965
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1965
CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE
to reduce the sources of the problem. Professional medical pride
will be aided if counsel and the courts will cease to refer to such
cases as "malpractice claims." The words "malpractice" and
"guilty" connote general incompetence and malevolence. Too
many jurors (and too many doctors) are fearful that a finding
of "guilty" will cause the good doctor to lose his right or ability
to continue his practice, and too many fear that "malpractice"
is a description of overall general inability to treat any patient
in any manner in the future. But the same physician who can
fail to stop at a stop sign through momentary neglect can like-
wise make an error on a prescription or forget to read a hospital
chart. The avoidance of the term "malpractice" is aided by in-
sisting that the lawsuit is one for negligence and that the stand-
ard of practice of the medical community is merely evidence
which goes to the question of negligence.
The physician's fears may be somewhat alleviated if the
truth about medical negligence claims is emphasized. The Bar
should begin by an active and determined program of evangelism
among individual doctors and medical societies which will ex-
plain to them the true volume of malpractice litigation, the un-
likelihood of hazard to a careful physician, and their moral obli-
gation to support such litigation in advancing their own pro-
fession. Section 4 of the "Principles of Medical Ethics" adopted
by the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association
in June, 1957, provides: 29
The medical profession should safeguard the public and it-
self against physicians deficient in moral character or pro-
fessional competence. Physicians should observe all laws,
uphold the dignity and honor of the profession, and ac-
cept its self-imposed disciplines. They should expose, with-
out hesitation, illegal or unethical conduct of other mem-
bers of the profession.
Doctor Norman A. Welch, President of the A. M. A., in a state-
ment to the state trial judges in New York City on August 8,
1964, said: 30
It is entirely ethical for a physician to testify for either the
plaintiff or the defendant in personal injury litigation, in-
29 Principles of Medical Ethics, Ch. III, Art. I, Sec. 4, 167 A. M. A. J. 20
(1958).
30 See, Welch, Medical Testimony and Professional Liability, Ins. Law J.
No. 502, p. 673 (Nov. 1964). See also, Stetler, Medicolegal Professional Co-
operation, 441 Ins. L. J., pp. 633-38 (Oct. 1959).
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cluding malpractice suits, providing his testimony is ob-
jective, honest and in a field of medicine in which he is
knowledgeable.
If all else fails, counsel might point out that the malpractice de-
fense lawyers, who are the chief harbingers of doom on this sub-
ject, are equally vocal in decrying an allegedly increasing level
of malpractice claims against lawyers. 3 1 While many law offices
carry professional liability insurance to protect their clients if
they should make an error, those lawyers are certainly not
shaking with fear and would not refuse to testify that another
lawyer's conduct was malpractice, when such was their honest
opinion.
Some communities have established malpractice review
committees of physicians and claimants' attorneys. These com-
mittees can be helpful to both the legal and medical profession
by discouraging unfounded malpractice claims, while assuring
that able witnesses will be provided in support of well-founded
claims. The success of these committees depends upon the
confidence of both the medical and legal communities in their
fairness to all concerned.
Finally, reform of the law itself can do much to relieve this
conflict. Some courts have eliminated the need for expert medi-
cal testimony as to the standard of care necessary in the cir-
cumstances by extending the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or by
concluding that the standard is "common knowledge."' 32 Each
of these approaches has some merit, but it tends to use an
artificially created legal doctrine to attack an equally artificial
legal doctrine.3 3 If medical negligence cases were not treated
differently from all other negligence cases, so that the jury
would itself be able to determine a reasonable standard of care,
on the basis of evidence as to available alternatives, courts would
31 See, e.g., Morris, Report of the Malpractice Insurance Committee, 30 Ins.
Counsel J. 404 (July 1963); Hutcheson, Lawyers, How Is Your Malpractice?,
30 Ins. Counsel J. 423 (July 1963).
32 See Annotations, 82 A. L. R. 2d 1262, 1269-1270; 83 A. L. R. 2d 53, at 81,
89, 93 (dentists); 76 A. L. R. 2d 788 (ear treatment); 93 A. L. R. 2d 313
(female organ treatment); 88 A. L. R. 2d 309 (male urinary tract treatment);
97 A. L. R. 2d 525 (as ground for directed verdict for plaintiff); c. f., 99
A. L. R. 2d 610 (insanity treatment); 99 A. L. R. 2d 1336 (obstetrical treat-
ment). See also Brophy, Highlights on Res Ipsa in Malpractice Cases, 502
Ins. L. J., pp. 645-51 (November 1964). See also, Morris, op. cit. supra,
note 21, at pp. 48-50.
33 See Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 333(1963).
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not have to stretch other legal doctrines. There is no reason
why a court should have to find that the defendant retained
complete control over a situation in which the alleged harm
would not result without negligence, in order to permit the case
to be decided by a jury. There is likewise no reason for a court
to itself determine whether the standard of care is one of "com-
mon knowledge" for a particular procedure, before permitting
the trier of fact to decide that very issue. Certainly, no jury
should be authorized to find that the defendant-physician was
negligent without evidence as to what was done and what could
have been done under the circumstances. However, arbitrary
insistence on an expert medical opinion as to an ultimate issue of
fact can be a positive disservice to a fair adjudication in this
type of case. And, when that insistence is compounded by re-
quiring that the opinion be rendered by a physician from the
same city and ordering that the defendant himself may not be
asked to express an opinion on this subject, the courts defeat
the very purpose they seemingly would want to accomplish.
Since the litigation of medical negligence cases is neces-
sarily an adversary procedure, changes in attitudes or tech-
niques of defense counsel are probably not feasible. Indeed,
there is some doubt whether an effort to restrain defense coun-
sel might be an unwise invasion of their role as advocates. This
does not mean that such counsel have a carte blanche to employ
unscrupulous devices for the advancement of their cause. Simi-
larly, the likelihood that the legal profession will have a de-
cisive impact on reforming the attitudes of the physicians is not
great. Nevertheless, efforts should be made in each of these di-
rections. The main thrust of reform would seem to lie in modifi-
cation of the legal rules unduly enhancing the conspiracy of
silence. This would be a slow but worthwhile process.
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss3/9
